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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE: 535-7767
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 92-0777-CA
Priority 2

RICHARD COPIER,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Statement of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction for this case is conferred upon the Court of
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2) (d) (1953, as
amended).
Statement of Issues and Standards of Review
Appellant argued only one issue, whether the Salt Lake City
ordinance for driving under the influence of alcohol is a public
offense as its language slightly differs that the language used in
the Utah State Code.

This Court should give no deference to the

ruling made in the trial court as it is a question of law and an
interpretation of statute.
4

Appellee raises a second issue that there is additional
language in City and State statutes that is identical.

That

language is an alternative to a person taking a chemical test and
could

have been the basis

defendant.

for the

jury verdict

to

convict

The standard of review is unclear as there is no

transcript of the lower proceedings.

However, appellee asserts

that the record reflects sufficient evidence to uphold the jury's
verdict.
Determinative Provisions or Statutes
The determinative statutes for this case are Section 12-24-100
of the Salt Lake City Code and Section 41-6-44, Utah Code Ann. 1953
(as amended).

Copies of the above statutes in effect at the time

of the proceedings in this case are set out in the Addendum
attached hereto.
Statement of Case
Defendant/Appellant Richard Copier (hereinafter referred to as
defendant) was charged by way of Information with Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol, a Class B misdemeanor, which offense occurred
on May 30, 1992, in Salt Lake City, Utah. The case was tried to a
jury on August 24, 1992, with the Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs
presiding.

The jury found defendant guilty (R. 43) and he was

subsequently sentenced by the Court (R. 66, 67-68).
Statement of Facts
As no transcript has been filed in this case, the following
facts are set out to provide this Court with some factual basis and
understanding for defendant's conviction.
5

A Salt Lake City police officer stopped defendant after
observing him run a red light. Defendant stated that he had had a
few drinks at a party, which was confirmed by the officer's
notation that he had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath.
Defendant took field sobriety tests but he was unable to perform
them adequately.
Police

He took a breath test at the Salt Lake City

Department, with

a result of

.101, as

shown by the

Intoxilyzer-Alcohol Analyzer test record card which was admitted
into evidence (A copy of the Operational Checklist and test record
card are attached in the Addendum hereto. They were admitted into
evidence by the trial court but withdrawn at the end of trial. R.
50, 51). The Intoxilyzer 5000 machine used by the Salt Lake City
police was properly maintained and working correctly at the time
defendant submitted to the breath test.
Summary of Argument
The Salt Lake City ordinance has only a semantic difference
from the driving under the influence provision in the State Code.
Appellant has provided no reasoning or basis to show that the
variance is "materially different".

The City ordinance should be

liberally construed as the underlying policies of the City and
State laws are the same.
City and State driving under the influence laws both have
alternative language to proving the results of a chemical test. A
person can be found guilty if he is
operating a vehicle".

"incapable of safely

As that issue was also submitted to the

6

jury, it could have been the basis for their decision, which should
be upheld by this Court.
Argument
I.

THE SALT LAKE CITY DUI ORDINANCE SETTING OUT A
"0.08% OR GREATER BY WEIGHT" STANDARD
CONSTITUTES A PUBLIC OFFENSE EVEN THOUGH THE
STATE STANDARD WAS REVISED TO ".08 GRAMS OR
GREATER".

Prior to revision of the Utah State Code, the Salt Lake City
ordinance and the State statute governing the presumed level of
impairment were the same:
greater by weight.

"a breath alcohol contemt of 0.08% or

. ."

The State legislature

subseguently

changed the statute to a "breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams
or greater".

Utah Code Ann. Section 44-6-44(1)(a).

Defendant's Brief states that the City and State statutes are
materially different (Defendant's Brief, p. 7). However, defendant
failed to provide the Court with any evidence reflecting that
alleged difference, other than the mere wording of the statutes.
In recent years, the Utah courts have clearly placed the burden on
appellants to "marshal the evidence".

See State v. Larsen, 828

P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1992); and Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 208
Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (1993).

Defendant failed to provide this Court

with any reason or basis on which to hold the wording in the
statutes is materially different.

As a result, this Court should

assume that the ruling from the lower court is accurate, which
ruling

denied

defendant's

Motion

after

review

of

Memoranda

submitted by both parties (R. 62, 53, 55, 58, 75). The only

7

evidence in the Record before this Court is that " .08%" and ".08
grams" have the same meaning (R. 64, 65).
As in the case of Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87 (Utah
App. 1990), the Salt Lake City and State statutes were at one time
consistent.

Subsequent amendments to the State statute have made

the wording in the laws inconsistent but the Court requires that
the

difference

"amount

Richfield City, at 89.

to

an

invalidating

inconsistency."

The Utah Supreme Court has held:

In determining whether an ordinance is in "conflict" with
general laws, the test is whether the ordinance permits
or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits,
and vice versa. . . Unless legislative provisions are
contradictory in the sense that they cannot coexist, they
are not to be deemed inconsistent because of mere lack of
uniformity in detail. Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 92 P.2d
671, 673 (Utah 1938). See also, Layton City v. Glines,
616 P.2d 588 (Utah 1980).
Counsel for defendant argues that the Supreme Court seems to
readopt the Dillon rule in Weese v. Davis County Com'n, 834 P.2d 1
(Utah 1992) (Defendant's Brief, p. 8), which rule was originally
adopted to prevent abuse by local governments.

The Weese case

involved a specific constitutional limitation on counties incurring
debt, an issue which may require more restrictions to prevent
abuse.
(Utah

However, the case of State v. Hutchinsonf 624 P.2d 1116
1980),

rejected

the

Dillon

rule,

stating

that

local

ordinances were to be:
. . . adjudged valid by the courts, provided they are
reasonable and consonant with the general powers and
purposes of the local corporation, and not inconsistent
with the United States Constitution, treaties, and
statutes, and the laws and policy of the state.
Hutchinson, at 1125 (emphasis added).

8

The Court continued:
"And the courts will not interfere with the legislative
choice of the means selected unless it is arbitrary, or
is directly prohibited by, or is inconsistent with the
policy of, the state or federal laws or the constitution
of this State or of the United States. . . Specific
grants should generally be construed with reasonable
latitude in light of the broad language of the general
welfare clause which may supplement the power found in a
specific delegation.
Hutchinson, at 1126 (emphasis
added).
This Court should liberally construe the Salt Lake City
statute as a public offense, in accordance with Hutchinson, finding
the underlying policy of the Salt Lake City ordinance and the State
statute is the same, particularly as there is no evidence of a
conflict between the laws.
The standard of review for a trial court's question of law and
statutory interpretation is to give no deference to the ruling of
the lower court. Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991).

In

that case, the Supreme Court stated:
The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give
effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the
purpose the statute was meant to achieve. Reeves, at
115.
The purpose of the Salt Lake City DUI statute is to prevent
people from operating a vehicle which they are in an intoxicated or
impaired condition, a purpose which corresponds to the underlying
purpose of the State Code.
II.

THE IDENTICAL LANGUAGE IN BOTH THE CITY AND
STATE STATUTES REGARDING AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE
RESULTS OF A BREATH TEST COULD HAVE BEEN THE
BASIS FOR THE JURY'S DECISION.

Driving under the influence of alcohol statutes for Salt Lake
City and the State of Utah contain an alternative to the chemical
9

test.

The alternative is the same and is unquestionably a public

offense:
Or if the person is under the influence of alcohol or any
drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to
a degree which renders the person incapable of safely
operating a vehicle.
(See statutes set out fully in
Addendum.)
The Information charging the defendant listed that alternative to
the City proving results of a breath test (R. 8).

Evidence of

impairment was submitted to the jury but way of testimony of two
police officers (R. 50). In addition, the jury was instructed as
to the alternative language of the statutes and the interpretation
of evidence presented at trial (R. 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 29).
The verdict form signed by the foreperson of the jury clearly
listed the alternative language (R. 43).
The jury could have rejected the breath test and based their
decision solely on the alternative language that defendant was
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. This Court should not now
substitute its judgment for that of the jury as the Record reflects
that the issue was properly submitted to them for consideration.
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah, 1985).
Most cases state the standard of review for a jury verdict
where sufficiency of the evidence is raised by an appellant. That
issue has not been raised in the present case and there is no
evidence for this Court to consider except that defendant was found
guilty (R. 43). The Supreme Court has delineated the function of
a jury as follows:
The function of a jury is to act as reasonable persons in
discerning the true state of the facts where factual
10

disputes exist, to discern the credibility of witnesses,
and to apply the law to the facts as instructed by the
trial court in reaching a verdict. Jury verdicts are
upheld
(I)f there is any substantial competent evidence upon
which a jury acting fairly and reasonably could make the
finding. . .
But if the finding is so plainly
unreasonable as to convince the court that no jury acting
fairly and reasonably could make the finding, it cannot
be said to be supported by substantial evidence. Reeves,
at 114-115.
As there is no evidence to show the jury was not acting fairly and
reasonably, their verdict should be upheld.
Conclusion
The evidence before this Court based on the Record does not
reflect a material difference between the provisions of the Salt
Lake City Code and the Utah State statute governing the offense of
driving under the Influence of alcohol. As a result, the Salt Lake
City Code should be upheld as a public offense, particularly in
view of the alternative language which could have been the sole
basis for the jury verdict.

The City respectfully requests that

this Court uphold the conviction of defendant.
Dated this 28th day of June, 1993.

*& srr77£^

,

Cheryr-D^-iu-ke
Marsha S. Atkin
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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Copier, Attorney
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84111, this 28th day of June, 1993.
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ADDENDUM
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2. "Passenger compartment" means the area of the vehicle normally occupied by the driver and his or her passengers, and includes areas accessible to them while traveling, such as a
utility or glove compartment, but does not include a separate
front or rear trunk compartment or other area of the vehicle
not accessible to the driver or passengers while inside the
vehicle.

shall be entitled to park at any parking meter and in the following identified restricted parking areas, without charge, notwithstanding any other state or municipal parking restriction:
Freight loading zones, passenger loading zones, and time-limited
parking zones.
B.

It is unlawful for such handicapped person to:
1. Park for longer than reasonable periods of time at all such
meters and restricted parking areas where the maximum metered
or designated time is longer than thirty minutes,
2.

12.24.030

Park for longer than the maximum metered or designated time
at all other meters and restricted parking areas except those
listed under subsection A of this section.

PERMITTING INCOMPETENT TO DRIVE PROHIBITED.

No driver or person having charge or control of any motor vehicle
shall require or knowingly permit any prohibited person, as set forth
in Section 12.24.030, or its successor, to drive the same or knowingly
permit or require the operation of any vehicle in any manner contrary
to law.
12.24.050

E. The provisions of subsection B shall not apply to passengers traveling in any duly licensed taxicab or bus.

INCOMPETENT DRIVERS DESIGNATED AND PROHIBITED.

No person under the age of sixteen years, and no person physically or
mentally disabled or incapacitated in any particular, temporarily or
permanently, shall drive a motor vehicle upon any street or alley,
provided such disability or incapacity is such as to interfere with
the reasonable and safe operation of such vehicle.
12.24.040

0. The provisions of subsections A and B of this section shall not
apply to passengers in the living quarters of a motor home or
camper, but the driver of the vehicle will be prohibited from
consuming alcoholic beverages as provided in subsection A of this
section.

F. Any person convicted of a violation of this section is guilty of
an infraction.
12.24.080

It is unlawful for any person under the influence of alcohol or any
drugs to be in or about any vehicle with the intention of driving or
operating such vehicle.
12.24.090

It is unlawful for the owner of any motor vehicle, or any person having such in charge, to permit same to be driven or operated on an}
street by any person who is a habitual usen of any drugs, or by an>
person who is under the influence of alcohol or any drugs.
12.24.100

PERMITTING INCAPABLE DRIVERS TO DRIVE PROHIBITED.

No owner or person in control of a vehicle shall knowingly permit
said vehicle to be operated by any person who is physically or
mentally disabled to such an extent that such person's judgment or
driving ability is impaired.
12.24.U70

DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS AND INTOXICANTS
PROHIBITED - PENALTIES

A. 1. It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for
any person to operate or be in actual physical control of c
vehicle within this city if the person has a blood or breatr
alcohol content of ,08 percent or greater by weight as showr
by a chemical test given within two hours after the allegec
operation or physical control, or if the person under the
influence of alcohol or any arug, or the combined intljence
of alcohol or any drug to a degree which renders the persor
incapable of safely driving a vehicle within this city,

DRINKING ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES IN VEHICLES.
2.

A.

No person shall drink any alcoholic beverage while driving a motor vehicle or while a passenger in a motor vehicle, whether the
vehicle is moving, stopped, or parked on any street or highway.

B.

No person shall keep, carry, possess, transport, or allow another
to keep, carry, possess or transport in the passenger compartment
of a motor vehicle, when the vehicle is on any public street or
highway, any container whatsoever which contains any alcoholic
beverage, if the container has been opened, the seal thereon
broken, or the contents of the container partially consumed.

C.

PERMITTING USE OF VEHICLE BY HABITUAL DRINKER OR DRUG USER.

INCAPABLE DRIVERS DESIGNATED AND PROHIBITED.

No driver shall operate a vehicle while his or her ability or alertness is so impaired through fatigue, illness or any other cause as to
make it unsafe for him or her to drive such vehicle.
12.24.060

INTOXICATED PERSONS IN OR ABOUT VEHICLES.

The fact that a person charged with violating this section is
or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug does
not constitute a defense against any charge of violating this
section.

B. Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall oe based upor
grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood, anc
the percent by weight alcohol in the breath shall be based upor
grams of alcohol per 21U liters of breath.
C.

Every person who is convicted the first time of a violation of «
section A of this section shall be guilty of a Class B imsdemear

D.

1.

For purposes of this section:
1.

"Alcoholic beverages" shall have the meaning provided in Section 32-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, or its successor, and

In addition to the penalties provided for in subsection C ot
this section, the court shall, upon a first conviction, impose either.

the plea, including whether or not defendant had consumed a l cohol or drugs, or a combination of both, in connection with
the offense. The prosecutor's statement shall be an offer of
proof of the facts which show whether or not defendant had
consumed alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, in connection with the offense.

«,.«-,.vii«ui cu-rorxy nours,
witn empnasls on serving in the drunk tank of the j a i l , or
b.

E.

2.

In addition to the requirements of subsection Dla or 01b
above, the court shall order the person to participate m an
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehab i l i t a t i o n f a c i l i t y , at the person's expense.

1.

Upon a second conviction within f i v e years after a f i r s t conviction under this section, in addition to the penalties provided for in sub-section C, the court shall impose either:
a.

b.

2.

F.

Require the person to work in a community-service work
program tor not less than twenty-four hours nor more than
f i f t y hours,

1.

2.

A mandatory j a i l sentence of not less than two-hundredforty consecutive hours nor more than seven-hundred-twenty
hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank- of the
j a i l , or

2.

J.

Require the person to work in a community-service work
proyram for not less than eighty hours nor more than twohundred-forty hours.

In addition to the requirements of subsection Ela or ElD
above, the court shall order the person to participate in an
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehab i l i t a t i o n f a c i l i t y , and the court may, in i t s d i s c r e t i o n ,
order the person to obtain treatment at the person's expense
at an alcohol r e h a b i l i t a t i o n f a c i l i t y .
Upon a subsequent conviction within f i v e years after a second
conviction under this section, in addition to the penalties
provided for in subsection C, the court shall impose either:
a.

A mandatory j a i l sentence of not less than seven-hundredtwenty hours nor more than two-thousand-one-hundred-sixty
hours with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the
j a i l , or

b.

Require the person to work in a community-service work
project for not less than eighty nours nor lore :han
seven-hunared-twenty nours.

In addition to the requirements ot subsections Fla or Fib
above, the court snail order the person at the person's
expense to obtain treatment at an alcohol
rehabilitation
faci 1 l t y .

(a.

In no event shall any combination of imprisonment and/or communi t y service imposed under subsections L, 0 , E and F above exceed
six months' duration.

H.

No portion of any sentence imposed under subsection C shall be
suspended, and the convicted person shall not be e l i g i b l e for
parole or probation u n t i l such time as any sentence imposed
under subsections D, E or F of this section has been served.

I.

1.

When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest
to a charge of a violation of Section 12.52.350 of this t i t l e ,
or i t s successor, in satisfaction of, or as a substitute f o r ,
an original charge of a violation of this section, the
prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis for

K.

The court shall advise the defendant, before acceptmy the
plea offered under subsection I I above, of the consequences
of a violation of Section 12.52.35U of this t i t l e , or i t s
successor, in substance as follows: " I f the court accepts
the defendant's plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of
violating said Section 12.52.350, and the prosecutor states
for the record that there was consumption of alcohol or drug'
or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with
the offense, the resulting conviction shall be a prior offense fo the purpose of subsections E and F of this section."

A peam officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a
violation of this section when:
1.

The violation is coupled with an accident or c o l l i s i o n in
which the person is involved, or

2.

The officer has reasonable cause to believe a v i o l a t i o n has
in fact been committed by the person, although not in the
o f f i c e r ' s presence.

This section 12.24.100 was enacted to be in harmony with and, in
substance, the same as Section 41-6-44, l(tah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended, or i t s successor.

12.24.110

CHEMICAL TESTS AS EVIDENCE.

A.

In any action or proceeding in which i t is material to prove that
a person was driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle
while under the influence ot alcohol or with a blood alcohol content s t a t u t o r i l y prohibited, the results of a chemical test or
t e s t s , as authorized under Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, or I t s successor, shall be admissible as evidence.

B.

I f the chemical test was taken within two hours of the alleged
driving or actual physical c o n t r o l , the blood alcohol level of
the person s h a l l , at the time ot the alleged driving or actjal
physical control, be presumed to have been not less than the level ot the alcohol determined to be in the blood by the chemical
test.

C.

I f the chemical test was taken more than two hours a f t e r the a l leged driving or actual physical c o n t r o l , the test result shall
be admissible as evidence of the person's blood alcohol level at
the time of the alleged driving or actual physical control, but
the t r i e r of fact shall determine what weight shall oe given to
the result of the t e s t .

0.

The foregoing provisions of this section shall not prevent a
court from receiving otherwise admissible evidence as to a defendant's blood alcohol l e v e l , or of other violations of this
t i t l e , at the time of the alleged driving or actual physical
control.

E.

This Section 12.24.110 was enacted to be in harmony with and n
substance the same as Section 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 5 , Utah Code Annotated, as
amended, or i t s successor.

41-6-43.10

MOTOR VEHICLES

(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs reckless driving,
or operating a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons
or property shall be consistent with the provisions of this code which govern
those matters.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-43, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 99, § 11; 1987, ch. 138, § 36.
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1978,
ch. 33, § 54 repealed old § 41-6-43 (L. 1941, ch.
52, § 33; C. 1943, 57-7-110; L. 1957, ch. 75,
§ 1; 1967, ch. 88, § 1; 1969, ch. 107, § 1), relating to powers of local authorities as to driving
while intoxicated and reckless driving, and a
new § 41-6-43 was enacted by Laws 1979, ch.
242, § 12.

Laws 1983, ch. 99, § 11 repealed former
§ 41-6-43 (L. 1979, ch. 242, § 12), relating to
powers of local authorities, and enacted
present § 41-6-43.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "operating" for "driving"
both places it appears in this section and made
minor changes in punctuation.
Cross-References. — Traffic regulations,
powers and duties of cities as to, § 10-8-30.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Effect of interim repeal.
Powers of cities.
Effect of interim repeal.
The interim repeal of this section did not
render municipalities without authority to
enact ordinances prohibiting driving under the
influence of alcohol as municipalities had authority under their general police powers to
enact such ordinances in the absence of a spe-

cific legislative grant of authority. Layton City
v. Glines, 616 P.2d 588 (Utah 1980).
Powers of cities.
City held to have power to pass ordinance
prohibiting driving while intoxicated, notwithstanding statute on the subject. Salt Lake City
v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 296 et seq.

CcJ.S.
61A C J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 625
to 637.
Key Numbers. — Automobiles
332.

41-6-43.10. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 41-6-43.10 (L. 1955, ch.
71, § 1; 1957, ch. 78, § 2; 1983, ch. 99, § 12),

relating to negligent homicide, was repealed
by Laws 1985 (1st S.S.), ch. 1, § 2.

41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug or
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol
— Criminal punishment — Arrest without warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revocation of
license.
(1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any
person to operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this
state if the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours
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after the alleged operation or physical control, or if the person is under
the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol
and any drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of safely
operating a vehicle.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any
charge of violating this section.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) (a) Every person who is convicted the first time of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. But if the person has inflicted a
bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the
vehicle in a negligent manner, he is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care which an ordinarily
reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(4) In addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), the court
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less
than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours, with emphasis on serving
in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a communityservice work program for not less than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours and,
in addition to the jail sentence or the work in the community-service work
program, order the person to participate in an assessment and educational
series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction within five years after a first conviction
under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court shall, in addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a mandatory
jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than 720
hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require
the person to work in a community-service work program for not less than
80 hours nor more than 240 hours and, in addition to the jaril sentence or
the work in the community-service work program, order the person to
participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol
rehabilitation facility. The court may, in its discretion, order the person
to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five years after a second conviction under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court shall, in
addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than 2,160 hours with
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor
more than 720 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence or work in the
community-service work program, order the person to obtain treatment
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(c) No portion of any sentence imposed under Subsection (3) may be
suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation
until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. Probation
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or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation of this section or a
local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1) may not be terminated and the department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction, if it is
a second or subsequent conviction within five years, until the convicted
person has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that all
fines and fees, including fees for restitution and rehabilitation costs, assessed against the person, have been paid.
(6) (a) The provisions in Subsections (4) and (5) that require a sentencing
court to order a convicted person to: participate in an assessment and
educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility; obtain, in
the discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility;
or obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility; or
do any combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a violation of
Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsection (7). The
court is required to render the same order regarding education or treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection with a
first, second, or subsequent conviction under Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsection (7), as the court would render in
connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent
conviction requirements of Subsections 41-6-44(4) and (5).
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction under Section
41-6-45 which qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (7), is a
first, second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous
conviction under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a
prior conviction.
(c) Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any community-based or
other education program provided for in this section shall be approved by
the Department of Social Services.
(7) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under
Subsection 41-6-43(1) in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an original
charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state for the
record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not there had
been consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the
defendant in connection with the offense. The statement is an offer of
proof of the facts which shows whether there was consumption of alcohol
or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, in connection with
the offense.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of Section
41-6-45 as follows. If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no
contest to a charge of violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states
for the record that there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense, the resulting conviction is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5).
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section
41-6-45 which is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5).
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of
this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has
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occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to
believe that the violation was committed by the person.
(9) The Department of Public Safety shall suspend for 90 days the operator's license of any person convicted for the first time under Subsection (1),
and shall revoke for one year the license of any person convicted of any subsequent offense under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed within a
period of five years from the date of the prior violation. The department shall
subtract from any suspension or revocation period the number of days for
which a license was previously suspended under Section 41-2-130, if the previous suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of
conviction is based.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 34; C. 1943,
57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1957, ch. 75,
§ 1; 1967, ch. 88, § 2; 1969, ch. 107, § 2; 1977,
ch. 268, § 3; 1979, ch. 243, § 1; 1981, ch. 63,
§ 2; 1982, ch. 46, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 13; 1983,
ch. 103, § 1; 1983, ch. 183, § 33; 1985, ch. 46,
§ 1; 1986, ch. 122, § 1; 1986, ch. 178, § 29;
1987, ch. 138, § 37; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 8, § 2;
1988, ch. 17, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment divided Subsection (3) into Subsections
(3)(a) and (3)(b); deleted "of this section" before
"shall be punished" in the first sentence of
Subsection (3)(a); divided the former first sentence of Subsection (3)(a) into the first and second sentences, substituting "But" for "except
that" at the beginning of the second sentence of
Subsection (3)(a); divided Subsection (5) into
Subsections (5)(a) through (5)(c); divided the
former first sentence of Subsection (5)(a) into
the first and second sentences; substituted
"may" for "shall" in three places in Subsection
(5)(c); deleted "such time as" after "probation
until" in the first sentence of Subsection (5)(c);
deleted "and unless" before "the convicted person" near the end of Subsection (5)(c); divided
Subsection (6) into Subsections (6)(a) and
(6)(b); deleted "of this section" at the end of
Subsections (7)(b) and (7)(c); substituted "the
officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred" for "the violation is coupled
with an accident or collision in which the person is involved and when the violation has, in
fact, been committed" in Subsection (8); substituted "probable" for "reasonable" near the end
of Subsection (8); deleted "a period of" before
"90 days" and "of this section" before "and
shall revoke" in Subsection (9); and made
minor changes in phraseology, punctuation,
and style.
The 1986 amendment by Laws 1986, ch. 122,
in Subsection (4) deleted "for" following "provided" and substituted "240 hours" for "ten
days", "24 hours" for "two" and "80 hours" for
"ten days"; in Subsection (5)(a) substituted
"240" for "48", "720 hours" for "ten days", "80
hours" for "ten", and "240 hours" for "30 days";
and in Subsection (5)(b) substituted "720" for

"30", "2,160 hours" for "90 days", "240" for
"30", and "720 hours" for "90 days".
The 1986 amendment by Laws 1986, ch. 178,
in Subsection (3)(a), substituted the language
beginning "is guilty of a class B misdemeanor"
for "shall be punished by imprisonment for not
less than 60 days nor more than six months, or
by a fine of $299, or by both the fine and imprisonment" in the first sentence and the language beginning "is guilty of a class A misdemeanor" for "shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one
year, and, in the discretion of the court, by a
fine of not more than $1,000" in the second
sentence.
The 1987 amendment designated the previously undesignated provisions of Subsection (1)
as last amended by Laws 1986, ch. 178, § 29
and rewrote the provisions of Subsection (a) to
the extent that a detailed analysis is impracticable; in Subsection (2) added the phrase following "centimeters of blood"; in Subsection
(3)(a) deleted "imprisonment shall be for not
fewer than 60 days" following "misdemeanor"
in the first sentence and deleted "any imprisonment in the county jail shall be for not more
than one year" at the end of the second sentence; in Subsection (6)(b) deleted "41-6-44 or";
in Subsection (7)(a) substituted "41-6-43(1)" for
"41-6-43(b)"; in Subsection (9) substituted
"41-2-130" for "41-2-19.6"; and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.
This section was set out in 1987 as reconciled
by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel.
The 1987 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective
June 5, 1987, substituted "concentration of .08
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test"
for "content of .08% or greater by weight as
shown by a chemical test" in Subsection (1) (a),
substituted the provisions of Subsection (2) for
the former provisions which read "Percent by
weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based
upon grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic
centimeters of blood, and the percent by weight
of alcohol in the breath shall be based upon
grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath", and
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